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To the Honorable Judges of the Utah Court of Appeals:
Pursuant to the provisions of Rule 35 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Pro-Tech
Restoration dba Stone Carpets (hereinafter "Pro-Tech"), the above-named appellee, respectfully
petitions the court to grant a rehearing and reconsideration of the appeal in the above-entitled
cause. In support of this Petition, appellee represents to the court as follows:
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A.

Prior to trial, plaintiff filed a motion to limit the number of defendants'

peremptory challenges. The court denied plaintiffs motion, finding diverse interests between
the defendants, allowing plaintiff and each defendant three peremptory challenges to the main
panel and each party one peremptory challenge as to the alternate juror.
B.

Following an adverse jury decision, on September 1, 1993, plaintiff filed a Motion

for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict (Rule 50) and Motion for New Trial (Rule 59). In
her memorandum in support, plaintiff did not assert as a basis for a new trial that the trial judge
had erred in granting each defendant separate peremptory challenges nor the denial of her
Motion to Limit Defendants' Peremptory Challenges.
Plaintiff also filed a reply memorandum in support of her motion on September 30, 1993,
and again did not raise the issue regarding peremptory challenges.
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On October 29, 1993, the court entered its Order Denying Plaintiffs Motion for
Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict and Motion for New Trial based on the issues raised in
plaintiffs motion.
C.

On November 12, 1993, plaintiff subsequently filed a Motion for Relief from

Order Denying Plaintiffs Motion for New Trial pursuant to Rule 60(b). The memorandum filed
in support of plaintiff s motion failed to acknowledge that the Motion NOV and for New Trial
had not included a claim regarding peremptory challenges. Instead, as if attempting to amend
her failed Rule 59 motion, plaintiff cited Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and
for the first time noted Randle v. Allen. 862 P.2d 1332 (Utah 1993), arguing that the district
court's original denial of plaintiffs5 Motion to Limit the Defendants' Peremptory Challenges was
incorrect.
D.

On November 24, 1993, after considering the Randle decision and respective

memoranda and oral argument, the trial court denied plaintiffs Rule 60(b) motion. (See. Order
attached hereto as Exhibit MA,M R. 1036.2-1036.3.) The district court stated, orally and in its
order, that it had found at the time of qualifying the jury that there was sufficient adversity
between the defendants to justify granting each defendant separate peremptory challenges.
The Court of Appeals failed to address the issue that the plaintiffs assertion of claimed
error of the trial court was not timely raised under Rule 59 and that a motion under Rule 60(b)
does not extend the time for appeal. See, Goddard v. Bundy. 241 P.2d 462 (Utah 1952).

3

The court has overlooked or misapprehended the following points of law and/or fact:
POINT I
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court of Appeals' failure to address the procedural background caused it to
incorrectly apply the standard of review. Instead of noting that "the trial court is afforded broad
discretion in ruling on a motion for relief from judgment under Utah R.Civ.P. 60(b), and its
determination will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion," Birch v. Birch. 771 P.2d
1114, 1117 (Utah App. 1989), the court cites that "this appeal turns on the interpretation of Rule
47 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and, thus, presents a question of law." See, Slip
Opinion at 3.
The recitation and application of the accurate standard of review is "central to the
decision making of appellate courts (in that standards of review) set the power of the lens
through which appellate judges examine each issue." Norman H. Jackson, Utah Standards of
Appellate Review, Utah Bar Journal, October 1994, at 11. Whereas the Court of Appeals
afforded the trial judge's rulings on plaintiffs Rule 59 and 60 motions "no deference," the
correct standard of review of matters committed to the trial court's discretion is set forth in State
v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994). In employing a pasture metaphor to characterize the
spectrum of discretion granted to the trial court, the Utah Supreme Court explained,
Only when the trial judge crosses an existing fence or when the appellate court
feels comfortable in more closely defining the law by fencing off a part of the
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pasture previously available does the trial judge's de.——.

u_ u<x broad

discretion granted.
Id,, at 938.
POINT 11
THE ISSUE OF P E R E M P T O R Y CHALLENGES
WAS NOT TIMELY RAISED
Following the denial of plaintiff s Rule 59 motion, plain

~ >ub^v- nflv filed a Motion

for Relief from the Order Denying the Muliun Un

-

-.-'•-;.,. s

grounds therefor "a recent development and the law, speciikali} the Utah Supreme Court's
ruling in Randle v. Allen."
*<•« rt +^- -

T".She cannot under the
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;ue of peremptory challenges in her Rule 59 motion.

JIC OU(0) extend the time for asking for a new trial based on

iaiienges.
The motion for relief from, the order denying her motion for a new trial cannot be based

on grounds not asserted in tlu. motion lor new trial y i
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court In the timely filed motion.
The Rule 60(b) motion asked the trial court for relief from an order upon gi ounds not
present ril li IL i.iii. (
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in pi nal motion.

Although the Rules of Procedure are tc
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~ Hberally construed to secure the just
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time for taking any action under Rules
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' may not extend the
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except to the extent

and under the conditions stated in them." Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 6(b). Hence, although
a trial court has broad discretion in granting new trials, "its power is not without limitation and
cannot be exercised capriciously or arbitrarily" and its actions must conform to established rules
and procedures in Utah courts. Kettner v. Snow. 13 Utah 2d 382, 384 (1962).
Rule 59(b) provides that "a motion for new trial shall be served not later than ten days
after the entry of judgment." Although Rule 60(b) permits "a reasonable time" in which to make
a motion for relief from judgment, when "an untimely motion is made, the trial court's only
alternative is to deny the motion." Burgers v. Maiben. 652 P.2d 1320, 1321 (Utah 1982). The
issue of what constitutes a reasonable time under Rule 60(b) is reserved to the trial court. As
noted previously, this court recognizes that "the trial court is afforded broad discretion in ruling
on a motion for relief from judgment under Utah R.Civ.P. 60(b), and its determination will not
be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion." Birch v. Birch. 771 P.2d 1114, 1117 (Utah App.
1989) (citations omitted).
The trial court's decision to deny plaintiffs Rule 60(b) motion is consistent with
precedent which establishes that Rule 60(b) may not be used to extend the time in which a
motion may be filed pursuant to Rule 59. Goddard v. Bundy. 121 Utah 299, 310, 241 P.2d 462
(1952).
Deference to the trial court's judgment is particularly appropriate in this instance.
Plaintiff first raised the issue of peremptory challenges in a pretrial motion to limit the number
of peremptory challenges given each defendant and should have raised it in the Rule 59 motion
6

for a new trial if intending to rely upon it. Plaintiff may not avoid compliance with the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure solely upon the fortuitous timing of the Supreme Court's opinion in
Randle v. Allen. Rather, failure to adhere to the time limits contained in the Rules amounts to
a waiver of plaintiffs right to assert an attack based upon the number of peremptory challenges
granted to the parties.
It is possible that reasonable judges would reach different conclusions on plaintiffs
motion, however, "this court will not substitute its judgment as between two reasonably
conflicting views, even though we may have come to a different conclusion had the case come
before us for de novo review." Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of Review. 776 P.2d 63, 68 (Utah
App. 1989). In matters reserved for the trial court's discretion, the issue is whether the trial
court may "reach one of several possible conclusions about the legal effect of a particular set
of facts without risking reversal." Pena, supra, at 937. Of course, as previously noted, the
power of the appellate court's reviewing "lens" is weakest where, as here, the trial court's
determination is at the "extreme end of the spectrum."
The Opinion of the Court of Appeals failed to address this untimely raising of the
peremptory challenge issue. The raising of such issue in the trial court was beyond the 10 day
time limit under Rule 59 and cannot be the basis of the appeal. This issue of timeliness and use
of Rule 60(b) as the vehicle for assertion of the issue was not addressed by the Opinion of the
Court of Appeals and entitles petitioners to a rehearing of this appeal.
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POINT m
THE DETERMINATION OF ADVERSENESS BETWEEN
THE DEFENDANTS WAS A FACTC)XL DETERMINATION
FOR THE TRIAL COURT
In its Opinion, the court notes that "different 'sides' exists for purposes of Rule 47(e) if
there is a 'substantial controversy' between co-parties 'respecting the subject matter of this
suit.'"

Slip Opinion at 5. The court subsequently presents a lengthy hypothetical before

concluding that "such a scenario may well warrant separate sets of peremptory challenges to
defendants." Slip Opinion at footnote 4.
The court's statement of the law, coupled with its accompanying hypothetical,
conclusively establishes that the determination of whether sufficient "adverseness" exists between
the parties such as to warrant granting additional peremptory challenges must be a question of
fact. The determination must be based on issues broader than the mechanical query of whether
nominal defendants filed crossclaims.

See, Sutton v. Otis Elevator. 68 Utah 85 (1926)

(permitting peremptory challenges among multiple defendants although crossclaims were not
filed). Instead, it is based on information gleaned from the entire proceedings and may include:
(1) whether the parties employed the same attorneys; (2) whether separate answers were filed;
(3) whether the parties interests were antagonistic. See, Carraro v. Wells Fargo Mtg. & Equity.
744 P.2d 915, 918 (New Mexico App. 1987), Diamond Shamrock Corp. v. Wendt. 718 S.W.2d
766, 768 (Texas App.-Corpus Christi 1986). In its order denying Plaintiffs Motion for Relief
from Order Denying plaintiffs Motion for a New Trial Pursuant to Rule 60(b), the court
8

explain A, "ilu ,il lli" I• 11 • -

I ll> hanmg in chambers on the motion to limit peremptory

challenges, the court made findings at that time that there was sufficient adversity between the
various defendants din I) filial Yk1i dcluklanl vv.ts nifitln! to sqianife peremptory challenges."
(See. Order attached hereto as Exhibit "A," R 1036.2-1036.3.) Consequently, the trial court's
determination of adversity between the parties, the basis loi

h award ul' (<i»ui puvmpioiy

challenges to each of the named defendants, should not be disturbed unless "the factual findings
made by the trial court are not adequately supported by the record, resolving all disputes in the
e1

it I rial court's determination." Pena, supra, at 935, 936,

(citations omitted).
The Opinion \A NIL1 < Viiif oi Appeals LulnJ lo address; this factual determination, the
standard of review of such factual determination and why it was not in compliance with the
Supreme Court decision in Randle.
POINT IV
THE COURT FAILED TO ADDRESS
THE 14TH AMENDMENT ISSUE
Appellee, Pro-Tech, in its brief on appeal asserted that the Supreme Court in Sutton and
in Randle were never presented with the issue of equal protection und •.
In petliiiiCiil luiiiil, dial provision provides,
No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States nor shall deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction equal protection of the laws. (Emphasis added.)
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In issuing its Opinion, this court also overlooked and failed to address the fact that its
interpretation of Rule 47(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure deprives the litigant of their
right to equal protection under the 14th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. As is more fully
set out in appellee's brief, the court's application of Rule 47(c) effectively deprives some
litigants of rights granted to other litigants in the same proceeding by providing certain parties
only a share of peremptory challenges proportionate to the number of parties in the litigation,
while allowing the opposing party its full number of peremptory challenges.
In this instance, the adversity and hostility between Smith and Pro-Tech mandated
appointment of separate counsel under the Rules of Professional Responsibility. By requiring
Smith and Pro-Tech to share peremptory challenges, the court's ruling nevertheless prohibits
defendants from enjoying the same protections of the laws afforded to plaintiff.
POINT V
THE COURT FAILED TO ADDRESS THE DUE
PROCESS ISSUE UNDER THE 5TH AMENDMENT
The court also overlooked the fact that the sharing of peremptory challenges potentially
"puts it in the power of the plaintiff to deprive the real parties sought to be charged of the right
to interpose even one peremptory challenge." Sutton v. Otis Elevator Co.. 68 Utah 85, 143
(1926). To name a defendant in a suit, and then to deprive that defendants of the same right to
challenge any of the jurors the plaintiff may exercise, is to deny due process to such defendant
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iin'IiMliiifj llit1 PIJL'III (» fffcTiivc nsMsfatM'*1 <»< t'onnsol, in derogation of the 5th Amendment to the
U.S. Constitution.
POINT1 VI
THE COURT FAILED TO ADDRESS THE
ISSUES UNDER THE UTAH CONSTITUTION
• The courl .thi incrliMikul lli.il ihr ii|i|ik'iilinii \A Rule 47(c) is unconstitutional under
Article 1 § 24 of the Utah Constitution which provides "all laws of a general nature shall have
uniform operation." As the operation of 1:1 le lav i i n ist be \ it rife i i i i, a la\ tl lat is si iperficially
uniform may still be unconstitutional.

Lee v. Gaufin. 867 P.2d 572 (Utah 1993)

this

instance, Rule 47(c) does not operate uniformly and is unconstitutional in th, il ii I reals «JcH:iiclai)ls
differentlj tha i I plaintiff by allowing the plaintiff three peremptory challenges, yet requires
defendants to share peremptory challenges. In issuing its Opinion, this court should consider
the constitute

u in other contexts. See,

Greenwood v. City of North Salt Lake. 817 P.2d 816 (Utah 1991) (holding that a law must
apply equally to all persons within a class); Malen v. Lewis.

984)

(determining that the Utah automobile guest statute is unconstitutional under this section);
Johnson v. Stoker. 685 P.2d 539 (Utah 1984) (holding that t
i

^stitutional under this section).
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yuesl statute is

POINT VII
THE COURT FAILED TO ADDRESS THE ISSUES
RAISED BY SHARED PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES
Finally, a strict rule requiring peremptory challenges to be shared would work injustice
other than the federal and state constitutional violations. The court's interpretation overlooked
the fact that the rights of either party, or of both parties, could be seriously jeopardized or
entirely deprived in multi-party actions, if they cannot agree on peremptory challenges. For
example, although in this instance plaintiff conceded that the rights of Pleasant Grove City were
sufficiently disparate from the rights of Smith and Pro-Tech, the practical problem remains
whether Smith or Pro-Tech receives all three peremptory challenges in the absence of an
agreement between the parties or whether the rules require strict agreement among both parties
before any of their peremptory challenges may be exercised.
WHEREFORE, appellee prays that a rehearing be granted and that on rehearing this
court's Opinion dated December 21, 1995, be withdrawn and the court enter a new opinion
affirming the judgment of the trial court.
DATED and signed this Y

day of January, 1996.

M. Dayle Jeffs /
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CERTIFICATE
As counsel for appellee, I hereby certify that the foregoing Petition for Rehearing is not
frivolous and is presiMilvil in P ^ M I faith and ih I <<>i illf/liy

DATED and signed this /

day of January, 1996.
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Hand Delivered
Lynn C. Harris
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Robert L. Moody
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Mailed
John M. Chipman
Clifford J. Payne
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EXfflBIT "A

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
SHIRLEY CARRIER

|
ORDER

Plaintiff,
vs.

|
|

PRO-TECH RESTORATION dba STONE
|
CARPETS, WILLIAM ROGER SMITH, and
THE CITY OF PLEASANT GROVE,
|
Defendants.

|

Civil No. 910400680
Judge Ray M. Harding

This matter came before the Court on the plaintiffs Motion for Relief from Order
Denying Plaintiffs Motion for a New Trial Pursuant to Rule 60(B), Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure and Motion for Expedited Hearing. The plaintiff was represented in the Court by
Lynn C. Harris; defendant, Pro-Tech Restoration, was represented by M. Dayle Jeffs;
defendant, William Roger Smith, was represented by Robert L. Moody; and the defendant,
Pleasant Grove City, was represented by John M. Chipman.
The Court having reviewed the memorandums in support of the motion and in opposition
thereto, having heard the oral arguments of counsel for the respective parties, and having been
fully advised in the premises now makes and enters the following:

ORDER
The Court noted that at the time of the hearing in chambers on the motion to limit
peremptory challenges, the Court made findings at that time that there was sufficient adversity
between the various defendants, that each defendant was entitled to separate peremptory
challenges. Accordingly, the Court now,

DENIES the Motion for Relief from Order Denying Plaintiffs Motion for New Trial.

DATED AND SIGNED this

day of November, 1993.

Ray M. Harding
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